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Case No. 880172 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statements of Jurisdiction, Issues, the Case, and 
Summary of Argument are contained in Appellant's opening brief. 
Appellant relies on that opening brief and the points raised therein 
and makes the following arguments in reply. Points not addressed in 
this Reply Brief are adequately briefed in Appellant's opening brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant relies on the Statement of Facts set forth in 
his opening brief and points out that the facts which the State 
outlines in its opening brief for the most part are outlined only in 
the Information and have not been adjudicated in this case. 
Mr. Russell entered guilty pleas to only three counts of the 
ten-count Information. The Affidavit of Defendant found at R. 31-2 
and the court's repetition of the facts stated in that Affidavit 
(Transcript Dated April 14 and May 12, 1986 at 8-9) outline the only 
facts ultimately adjudicated in this case. See Addendum A 
containing Affidavit and relevant portions of transcript. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINIMUM MANDATORY 
SENTENCING PROVISIONS CAN BE RAISED AT THIS 
JUNCTURE. 
(Reply to Point I in Respondent's Brief) 
During sentencing, trial counsel relied on the 
"inescapable mitigating circumstance" of Appellant's age (T. 14). 
He also pointed out that the ages of 16 to 21 "are pivotal periods 
in anybody's life" and that a "commencement of the dramatic change 
in his thought process can adequately occur within that 5-year 
period" (T. 14). 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2687, 
101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (plurality opinion), the Court focused in 
part on the distinction between children and adults in their 
amenability to change in reaching its decision that 
fifteen-year-olds are "not capable of acting with the degree of 
culpabilty that can justify the ultimate penalty." 101 L.Ed.2d at 
710. By pinpointing the mitigating circumstance of Appellant's age 
and the room for growth and change in a fifteen-year-old, trial 
counsel said enough to preserve this issue for appellate review. 
Furthermore, even if this Court determines that trial 
counsel did not raise the issue, the fact that an illegal sentence 
resulted in this case requires review of this issue. In State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993-94 (Utah 1989), this Court reviewed the 
State's claim that the defendant had been sentenced improperly 
despite the fact that the State had not raised the sentencing issue 
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in the trial court or its brief and raised the issue for the first 
time during oral argument before the Supreme Court. Because the 
error involved an illegal sentence, this Court was willing to review 
it and reversed the case for resentencing based on that error. 
The error in the instant case similarly involves an 
illegal sentence which should not be allowed to stand. Mr. Russell 
should be given the same latitute allowed the State in Babbell1 and 
be permitted to have the legality of his sentence reviewed by this 
Court despite the fact that the issue was not raised in the trial 
court. In addition, because of the constitutional magnitude of this 
issue, Mr. Russell should be allowed to raise the issue on appeal. 
Finally, this Court is free to review an error not 
preserved at trial where such error is "plain." See State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989); Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). 
For error to be "plain," two requirements must be met. First, from 
the face of the record, it must appear that "it should have been 
obvious to a trial court that it was committing error [citations 
omitted]." Second, the error must affect the substantial rights of 
the defendant. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. Both such requirements 
are met in this case. 
1
 The State was actually allowed greater latitude in 
Babbell since it did not brief the issue despite its apparent 
awareness that the issue existed at the time it filed Respondent's 
Brief. See Babbell, 770 P.2d at 994. Counsel for Babbell was not 
given the opportunity to brief the issue as a result. In this case, 
the timely briefing of the issue regarding Appellant's claim that he 
was illegally sentenced allowed the State to respond in its brief. 
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POINT II. THE MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEME 
CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AS 
APPLIED TO MR. RUSSELL. 
(Reply to Point II in Respondent's Brief) 
A. AMENDMENT VIII, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
Although Mr. Russell acknowledges that "[t]he penalty of 
death is different from all other penalties" (State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), Respondent's Brief at 14), it does not follow 
that the reasoning set forth in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687 
(1988), acknowledging the lesser culpabiltiy of fifteen-year-olds is 
inapplicable to a non-death penalty case. The reasoning set forth 
in Appellant's opening brief at 7-9 is just as applicable in this 
case where the Appellant's sentence was the most severe sentence 
short of death which can be imposed in this State. 
The State contends that w[i]nherent in the certification 
decision is a determination of the criminal maturity of the offender 
as well as the appropriateness of the juvenile facilities to confine 
and rehabilitate the offender" (Respondent's Brief at 15) and seems 
to suggest that, as a result of the certification, the Appellant 
cannot rely on his youth as a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the ultimate sentence he receives. 
Contrary to the State's suggestion, the certification 
process and a challenge to the cruel and unusual nature of the 
sentence ultimately received are two distinct inquiries. Just as a 
fifteen-year-old who is tried as an adult and receives the death 
penalty can challenge the constitutionality of his sentence (see 
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Thompson v. Oklahoma), Mr. Russell, despite the certification, has a 
valid argument that his sentence violates state and federal 
constitutional proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. 
In addition, at a certification hearing, the focus is not 
only on the best interests of the child but also on the best 
interests of the public. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25 (1987). 
Hence, contrary to the State's assertion at 15, a fifteen-year-old 
youth can be certified without any determination as to his maturity. 
In the present case, the juvenile court judge relied 
primarily on the public interest in reaching her decision. She 
focused on the seriousness of the crimes charged, Mr. Russell's 
juvenile history, attempts at rehabilitation, and the protection of 
the community. See Addendum A to Appellant's opening brief. The 
only determination the juvenile judge made with regard to 
Mr. Russell's maturity was the following: 
That, although considered somewhat immature 
emotionally, said juvenile has established a 
life-style which is anti-social, manipulative, 
dangerous, and street-wise with a poor prognosis 
for change. His psychological profile reflects an 
ability to know right from wrong, lack of impulse 
control with little regard for others and avoiding 
responsibility by a strong denial system or 
projecting blame onto others for his misdeeds. 
His home environment lacks discipline and 
supervision and offers poor role models in two 
older brothers who have had extensive juvenile and 
adult court involvement. His mother is overly 
protective, bitter and hostile towards the Court 
and the system while the father has had little to 
do with programs offered by service of the Court. 
Addendum A to Appellant's opening brief at 7. 
Unlike an older offender, the home environment and lack 
- 5 -
of supervision was critical to the juvenile court's decision. This 
reflects on the immaturity of the Appellant, not his maturity. 
Furthermore, contrary to the State's suggestion, the 
juvenile judge made an express finding that Mr. Russell was 
"somewhat immature emotionally" and lacked impulse control—-a sign 
of immaturity. Hence, the fact that Mr. Russell was certified to 
stand trial as an adult in this case does not support the State's 
argument that the sentence was not cruel and unusual. 
B. ARTICLE I, § 9, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The Utah statutory distinctions between adults and 
juveniles set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 9-10 provide 
further support for Mr. Russell's argument that his sentence 
violates Article I, § 9 of the State constitution. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(5) AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING MR. RUSSELL. 
(Reply to Point IV in Respondent's Brief) 
The State misreads the record in this case when it 
asserts that " [d]efendant incorrectly asserts that defendant had no 
history of sexual violence." Respondent's Brief at 22. The four 
aggravated sexual assaults (in addition to several other crimes) 
referred to by the State to support its assertion were the charges 
in this instant case (R. 21-2). Because the four sexual assaults in 
Mr. Russell's record are the sexual assaults charged in the instant 
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case and there are no other convictions—or charges—for sexual 
assault, Appellant's statement at page 20 of his opening brief that 
"no other charges of a sexual nature occur on that [juvenile] 
record" is correct. In further support of this statement, the 
juvenile court judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order contain the following finding in #6. 
His record includes offenses of theft, assault, 
robbery, burglary, arson, possession of weapons, 
and violation of probation. 
Addendum A at 8. No offenses of a sexual nature occur in this list. 
Furthermore, although the trial judge relied on "[t]he 
failure of defendant to respond to rehabilitative treatment ordered 
as a result of several of juvenile court adjudications . . . " in 
imposing sentence, there is no showing in this record that 
Mr. Russell was ever placed in a secure facility in an attempt to 
rehabilitate his behavior.2 See Addendum A to Appellant's opening 
brief at 13-14. Hence, attempts to rehabilitate Mr. Russell, 
despite a juvenile record the juvenile court deemed "one of the most 
extensive this Court has experienced" (R. 9), did not include the 
punishment most likely to deter future illegal conduct and, in fact, 
rehabilitate him. 
2 The juvenile court's list of treatment attempts does 
not include the Decker Lake juvenile facility, the State school or 
any comparable secure facility. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant, Randy Russell, 
requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for 
resentencing. 
Respectfully submitted this n day of December, 1989. 
-<C^t' a W 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this / / day of December, 1989. 
^dt&r a1 a-
JOAN C . WATT % • 
DELIVERED by this day 
of December, 1989. 
ADDENDUM A 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. ) Affidavit of Defendant 
£A»JOY flw £jssgii~- \ Cnrmna,No Zb-^Hio 
Defendant 
I, ' < A ^ &^ \L»<xA\ , under oath, hereby acknowledge that 1 have entered a plea of 
guilty to the charge(s) of 
(Name of Crime) 
Elements . * Facts 
Oj
 ( * W *» . ^ f r W f r + ^ u ^ ^ ^ i w o* <u ^ 4 ^ ; U V J L > +UiL ro<U & ^ c l < d ^ lore , U , 
, * Tick- L w^.nt, Poop 4 r r e ^ U*r- VMft*^ *«<- i U ^ 
1 nave refceivedVcopy of the charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is * - S _ 
(Degree of Felony or Class of Misdemeanor) 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be S" t^ AOS*^ 4N> \ x£t-
 ) IOXTW. S^ \ 0 or—[v> ^g-Q r^" 
*vuruwuJvM UA^xAcAccbrt, prison term, lO^DOO fine, or both I am not on drugs or alcohol 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made I am represented by Attorney fc$k*.rn \Jcx^ ^ ^ ^ f 
,i7ho has explained my rights to me and I understand them 
1 I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire 
2 I know that if 1 wish to have a trial I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testifv on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, thejury will be told that this may not be held 
against me 
3 I know that if 1 were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
bevond a reasonable doubt, that anv verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guiltv must be bv a 
complete agreement ol all jurors 
4 I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myselfand that this means that 
I cannot becompened ro au~it that 1 have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless 1 choose 
to do so 
5 I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or bv the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal mv conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah tor review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid bv the 
State without cost to me 
6 I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered 
7 I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): 
TLis a a ^ v C.Ts IT yf ma .-TiC.TC - S-feck a^r^Jtz +L*+ 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. 1 am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, 
am JJJL .years of age, have attended school through the . 
understand the English language. 
Dated this / / day of 19 
Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this 
iderstand its contents. 1 
d I can read and 
iZvf r, <J-\*h^JLi 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTO vm/ Pio£fid..„ 
w> 
I certify that I am the attorney for
 y v r _ _ 
has read the Affidavit, or that 1 have read it to him, and I discussed/it with 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To/he bes 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
defendant named above and I know he 
im and believe he fully understands the 
my knowledge and belief th^statements, 
avit are/ifi a>vesoects^cS^rate and true. 
MM? 
Defense Attornev 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case *z*\n*tJ&8& K-A^bY KusSg*-*- defendant. 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made.and it is ordered that defendwitV^lea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered^// f //fs/Jf/ 
Done in Court thia -r -p rf Q,Z, day of f '/ / \ /A <•' 
H. DiXON HJNDLEY 
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the preparation of a pre-sentence report. 
THE COURT: I would do that where I have the 
discretion of either making it 5, 10 or 15 years. 
Under count one, to the charge of aggravated 
sexual assault, that is a first degree felony, as I 
have explained it to you, which occurred at 3715 West, 
5140 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
about December 1, 1985 in violation of title 76, 
chapter 5, section 405, Utah code annotated 1953 as 
amended, in that the defendant, Randy Ray Russell, a 
party to the offense, used or threatened the use of a 
deadly or dangerous weapon on Lynette Popp in the 
course of a rape or attempted rape. 
What now is your plea, guilty or not guilty? 
A Guilty. 
THE COURT: And as to count 5, you are charged 
with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, as I 
have explained it to you, which occurred at 3715 West 
5140 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or 
about December 1, 1985 in violation of title 76, 
chapter 6, section 302, Utah code annotated 1953 as 
amended in that the defendant, Randy Ray Russell, a 
party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally 
J took personal property in the possession of Lynette 
Popp, from the person or immediate presence of Lynette 



























Popp against her will by the use of a deadly weapon; 
to wit, a firearm. 
What now is your plea, guilty or not guilty? 
A Guilty. 
THE COURT: And as to count 7, aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony, as I have explained 
it to you, which occurred at 3715 West 5140 South in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about December 
1, 1985 in violation of title 76, chapter 5, section 
302, Utah code annotated, 1953 as amended in that the 
defendant, Randy Ray Russell, a party to the offense, 
did intentionally or knowingly without legal authority 
and against the will of Lynette Popp seized, confined, 
transported, detained or restrained with the intent to 
1 facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a 
felony or flight from a felony to inflict bodily 
injury on or to terrorize the victim of another, to 
commit a sexual act, what now is your plea, guilty or 
not guilty? 
A Guilty. 
THE COURT: Pleas of guilty are received and 
the Court finds that the pleas were freely and 
voluntarily made by the defendant, that he is not 
presently under the influence of any drugs, narcotics 
or alcoholic beverages nor has a physical or mental 
COOK & WILEY, INC. 
i * 
